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Abstract
We aim to reduce the social cost of congestion in many smart city
applications. In our model of congestion, agents interact over limited re-
sources after receiving signals from a central agent that observes the state
of congestion in real time. Under natural models of agent populations, we
develop new signalling schemes and show that by introducing a non-trivial
amount of uncertainty in the signals, we reduce the social cost of conges-
tion, i.e., improve social welfare. The signalling schemes are efficient in
terms of both communication and computation, and are consistent with
past observations of the congestion. Moreover, the resulting population
dynamics converge under reasonable assumptions.
1 Introduction
The study of “Smarter Cities” and “Smarter Planet” provides a host of new and
challenging control engineering problems. Many of these problems can be cast in
a congestion control framework, where a large number of agents such as people,
cars, or consumers compete for a limited resource. Examples of such problems
include consumers competing for electricity supply; road users competing for
space in the roads; users of bike (cars) sharing systems competing for access to
bikes (cars); and pedestrians competing for access. Within each such problem,
there are many variants. Pedestrians could be, for example, workers arriving at
work through a common gate, people leaving a stadium, waiting to check in at
an airport, or in an emergency. Each variant may have additional constraints,
but certain key features remain the same.
Addressing these problems is hugely challenging, even without considering
the issues of scale and limited communication. Resource utilisation should be
minimised while delivering a certain quality of service to individual agents.
Congestion is often caused by bursty arrivals, rather than the capacity and
quality-of-service constraints per se. Prediction systems to alleviate conges-
tion (informing customers of parking spaces, for example) create complicated
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feedback systems that are difficult to model and control. This latter issue of pre-
diction and optimisation under feedback clearly opens a wide area of research,
with links to reinforcement learning, adversarial game theory, and closed-loop
identification at scale.
An example of congestion due to synchronised demand is the well-known
flapping effect in road networks, parking lots, and bike-sharing stations. When
presented with alternative choices of resources, agents who choose greedily based
on past observations cause a congestion to oscillate between the resources over
time. The flapping effect occurs due to actuation delays and the feedback effect
between agents’ observations and actions: the agents’ choices are based on past
observations, but affect the future state of congestion. Our principal motivation
is to develop methods to break up this effect by taking into account these feed-
back issues and actuation delays. The starting point for our work is a simple
model of agent-induced congestion.
Our objective in this paper is to take a first step toward addressing some
of these problems. We wish to develop easy-to-implement algorithms, i.e. not
requiring much inter-agent communication or dedicated infrastructure, with the
objective of “de-synchronising” agents’ actions by providing them with signals,
whereby achieving a temporal load balancing over networks. Load-balancing
ideas in this direction have been recently suggested in a variety of applications
[17, 15, 16]. However, the work presented here goes far beyond what has been
proposed in several ways. First, it suggests non-trivial signalling schemes, as
opposed to the simple randomisation and differential pricing ideas. Second, it
takes into account heterogenous agent behaviour and actions. Furthermore, our
algorithms are provably scalable and can be analysed in a simple stochastic
setting, whereby yielding provable behaviour even in the case of large commu-
nication and actuation delays.
Specifically, we model a congestion problem as a multiagent system evolving
over time, where the agents follow natural policies. Roughly speaking, we show
that by varying the amount of uncertainty agents face, one can reduce congestion
in a controlled manner, and that a desirable state is arrived at asymptotically.
Our investigation proceeds as follows. First, we fix the congestion cost functions,
as well as the policies of each agent in a heterogeneous population. Then, we
vary the parameters controlling the distribution of the random signals sent to
the agents and evaluate the resulting social cost. We repeat this investigation for
two signalling schemes, and show that the social cost is optimised by introducing
uncertainty. Although our results are not difficult to derive, they are – to the
best of our knowledge – both novel and useful in a smart city context.
The paper is organised as follows. After describing the model of congestion
in Section 2, we set our work in context with the existing works in Section 3.
Next, we present in two sections our main results for two models of signalling and
agent-response. Section 4 considers a scalar signalling scheme and agents with
different actuation delays. Section 5 considers a broadcast interval signalling
scheme and agents with different risk aversion. In each of these two sections, we
show through theoretical and empirical analysis that withholding a non-trivial
amount of information from the agents reduce the overall social cost. Finally,
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(a) Cost functions: cA(n) , 1.2 + n/N
(dashed line) and cB(n) , 1 + (1.08 −
n/N)−1/22 (solid line).
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(b) One-step social cost as a function of the
fraction of agents choosing action A. The
dashed vertical line highlights the mini-
mum at a population profile of n∗/N = 0.2.
Figure 1: The setting of the running example. Despite the fact that the curves
do not intersect, the optimum of the social cost is achieved when both actions
are used – with a 0.2-fraction of agents choosing action A.
we present open questions in Section 6.
2 Model
We consider a model of congestion, where a population of N agents {1, . . . , N}
is confronted with two alternative choices at discrete time steps. Note this
situation is widespread and is generalised to the case if multiple choices (more
than two) in a straightforward manner1. Our approach is to model congestion
using probabilistic techniques. In this context alternative agent actions are
denoted by {A,B}, and time steps are denoted by t = 1, 2, . . .. Then, the
random variable ait denotes the choice of agent i at time t and n
A
t =
∑
i 1[ait=A]
be the number of agents choosing action A at time t. Throughout the paper, we
assume that each agent has to pick an action at every time t, i.e., the number
of agents choosing action B is nBt = N − nAt .
2.1 Costs
We also assume that each action has a cost. For example, this could be total
trip time or fuel consume. The total cost of action A at time t is a function
of the number nAt of agents that pick A at time t. Let cA : R+ → R+ denote
the so-called cost function for action A. If nAt agents choose action A at time
t, the cost to each of these agents is cA(n
A
t ). We define cB similarly to cA.
Figure 1a gives an example of these cost functions. The social cost C(nAt ) scales
the costs of the two actions at time t with the proportions of agents taking the
two actions, i.e.,
C(nAt ) ,
nAt
N
· cA(nAt ) +
nBt
N
· cB(nBt ). (1)
1Our results can be generalised to the case of arbitrarily many choices. The main change
consists of replacing binomial probability distributions by multi-nomial ones.
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The social cost corresponding to the cost functions of Figure 1a is shown in
Figure 1b. We also define the time-averaged social cost as follows:
ĈT ,
1
T
T∑
t=1
C(nAt ), (2)
which will be used to illustrate the evolution of the social cost in simulations.
The social optimum n∗ of the social cost C is defined in the usual way:
n∗ = min
n∈{0,1,...,N}
n
N
· cA(n) + N − n
N
· cB(N − n). (3)
Given this basic setting, we wish to control these various costs by influencing
individual agents’ decisions. This is done using simple signalling schemes. We
consider two specific schemes.
• The first one de-synchronises greedy agents with different actuation delays,
i.e., delays between receiving a signal and taking a corresponding action.
• The second one de-synchronises agents with various levels of risk aversion.
We will later show that under reasonable assumptions on the behaviour of
agents, these signalling schemes lead to desirable outcomes.
3 Related Work
Before proceeding, we now briefly mention some related work. Note that the
related work spans many fields and an exhaustive survey is neither possible nor
intended here.
Congestion problems are important in networking, control, operations re-
search, and game theory [20, 9, 23, 12]. Our work proposes signalling solu-
tions that reduce congestion by introducing a non-trivial amount of uncertainty
through randomisation. Although it may seem surprising given the simplic-
ity of the model, our results are unknown in the literature to the best of our
knowledge.
In operations research and mathematical optimisation, congestion problems
are often considered to be deterministic nonlinear resource allocation problems
(e.g., [20, 9, 23, 12]). In our work, however, the decision-maker only chooses the
signals to send, instead of an allocating the resources, per se.
Game theoretical models assume agents that act strategically, i.e., each agent
has a non-negligible effect on the outcome. The study of one-shot congestion
games has a long history, starting with [13]. The socially optimal and Nash
equilibrium outcomes of congestion games have been compared in [14, 1], and
[2]. These works show that when agents have full information, a resulting equi-
librium outcome can incur much higher total congestion than a socially optimal
outcome. An important distinction of our work is that, instead of a static game
theoretical model, we consider a dynamic model evolving over time. The agents
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do not observe other agents’ actions, nor do they act strategically: the only
information they have about the congestion of the resources is obtained from
signals broadcast by a central agent. We model a heterogeneous population
of agents, i.e., a large number of agents with a variety of fixed policies. These
agents do not act strategically in the fashion of price-taking participants in large
markets, which reflects situations where each agent has very limited impact on
the outcome as a whole. We take the view of the central agent, who has perfect
knowledge of the congestion across resources up to the previous time step, but
imperfect knowledge of the stochastic composition of the population of users.
Our goal is to minimise the social welfare or total congestion: we study how the
amount of information withheld can contribute to better social outcomes. In
contrast to evolutionary game theory, where agents of different types interact
and the population profile (or distribution) evolves over time, the population
profile remains fixed in our setting, and only the action profile evolve over time.
Our random signals are reminiscent of perturbation schemes in repeated
games, such as Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader [6], trembling-hand equilibrium
[19], stochastic fictitious play [7], or the power of two choices [11]. When the
agents use such randomised algorithms in their decision-making, the resulting
demand process has been shown to be behave rather well in theory (e.g., [11]),
as well as in a number of applications, e.g., in parking [17], bike sharing [15], and
charging electric vehicles [16]. However, we propose a signalling and guidance
scheme that combines randomization and intervals.
In the transportation literature, [21] introduces the notion of equilibrium as
the limit of the congestion distribution if it exists. [8] considers a number of
notions of noisy signals and studies greedy policies and equilibria. Our approach
is also related to signalling of parking space availability [18].
Our interval signalling scheme is reminiscent of the equilibrium outcome of
[4] in the context of signalling games in economics (cf. [22] for an up-to-date
survey). However, we consider the problem of optimal signalling in a dynamic
system, whereas [4] considers Nash equilibrium signalling in single-shot games.
For signalling games, [5] shows that more information does not generally improve
the equilibrium welfare of agents. Their notion of “information,” due to [3], is
however very different from ours.
Finally, let us note that there is also a related draft [10] by the present
authors, which explores the notion of r-extreme interval signalling and optimi-
sation over truthful interval signals.
4 Scalar Signalling
In this section, we model agents with different actuation delays – i.e., delays
between receiving a signal and taking a corresponding action – and introduce a
signalling scheme with the aim of desynchronising these agents.
Notationwise, let Ht denote the congestion costs at time t:
Ht , (cA(nAt ), cB(nBt )) ∈ R2.
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Figure 2: Block diagram for scalar signalling.
We write sit , sit(Ht−1) denotes the signal that the central agent sends to agent
i at every time t. For a fixed integer d, a signalling scheme is a sequence of
mappings
{sit : R2 → Rd | i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, 2, . . .}. (4)
4.1 σ-Scalar Signalling
We propose the following scalar signalling scheme, which corresponds to the
case d = 2 in (4), with a parameter σ > 0. At every time step t, the central
agent sends to each agent i a distinct signal sit := (y
A,i
t , y
B,i
t ) ∈ R2:
yA,it , cA(nAt−1) + wi,At , (5)
yB,it , cB(nBt−1) + wi,Bt , (6)
where {(wi,At , wi,Bt ) : i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, 2, . . .} are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d. ) zero-mean normal random variables such that E(wi,At −
wi,Bt )
2 = σ2 for all i and t.
Remark 1 (Random Signals). The signals {sit} in this section and the next are
generated by the random variables – {wi,At , wi,Bt } in this section and {νt, ηt} in
the next. In the rest of the paper, all expectations and probabilities are with
respect to the distribution of these random signals.
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In contrast to signalling schemes that solve an allocation problem to min-
imise the social cost and coerce each agent towards its assigned action, σ-scalar
signalling is scalar-truthful in the following sense:
EyA,it = cA(nAt−1), and Ey
B,i
t = cA(n
B
t−1),
for all i and t, where the expectation is over the random variables {wi,Xt }. We
will show in Section 4.3 that it is possible to reduce the social cost by setting
the parameter σ to a non-trivial value.
4.2 Agent Population and Policies
In response to the history of signals received prior to time t, every agent i takes
action ait. We assume that every agent acts based only on the signals, without
considering the response of other agents to its own action. This is a reasonable
assumption for three reasons. First, it is hard for the agent to obtain more
information than the signal sent by the central agent. Second, the agents know
that the signals received are truthful. Finally, the environment may be rapidly
changing, making independent decisions difficult.
Formally, let Sit denote the history of signals received by agent i up to time
t: Sit , {si1, . . . , sit−1}. Let St denote the set of possible realisations of signal
histories up to time t. A sequence of mappings from signal history to action,
St → {A,B} for t = 1, 2, . . ., is called a policy.
We let Ω denote the set of all possible types of agents. We introduce a
probability measure µ over the set Ω, which describes the distribution of the
population of agents into types. We assume that each type ω ∈ Ω is associated
with a policy, and every agent of type ω follows the policy piω : St → {A,B}.
For a population of N agents, we assume that µ is such that µ(O)N is a non-
negative integer for all O ⊆ Ω. Consequently, µ(ω)N denotes the number of
agents with policy piω. The following assumption simplifies the analysis.
Assumption 1. The true distribution µ is known to the central agent.
It is also reasonable that the central agent is capable of estimating the dis-
tribution of agents µ using statistical estimation techniques. Estimating distri-
bution of agents is possible by Bayesian or maximum a-posteriori methods. If
the estimation is not accurate, the central agent can always fall back to sending
no signal, which creates no more congestion than there already is.
4.2.1 pik-policies
In the case of scalar signalling, we assume that the set of possible types is
Ω = {1, 2, . . .}. Each agent of type k ∈ Ω has an actuation delay of k time
steps, i.e., it acts at time t upon the signal sit−k received at the time step t−k –
if the latter is defined. This effectively models the delay between when an agent
makes the decision which action to take, and when it contributes to congestion.
These delays do not come from communication, but from the agent-specific
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delay between making a decision and causing congestion. For example, a driver
may decide to take route A at time t − k, but begin the journey only at time
t, resulting in the delay between deciding on a route and reaching a particular
congested road segment. Another example is the computational delay between
receiving stock market information and deciding to invest in a stock.
More precisely, in response to the scalar signalling scheme with parameter
σ, i.e., sit := (y
A,i
t , y
B,i
t ), each agent i of type k acts according to the following
policy pik:
ait = pi
k(Sit) = pi
k(sit−k)
=
{
arg minX=A,B y
X,i
t−k, if t > k + 1,
A, otherwise,
(7)
i.e., the agent chooses greedily the action with the smallest cost signal at time
t− k.
4.3 Guarantees
In this section, we characterise the social cost resulting from σ-scalar signalling
and a population of agents following policies {pik : k = 1, 2, . . .}. Furthermore,
we show that the expected distribution of agents between the actions converges
for every initial condition.
For clarity of exposition, we first consider a homogeneous population. We
analyse the expected value and concentration property of the social cost, and
show the convergence of each agent’s action profile. Our analysis methods can
be used to obtain corresponding guarantees for the heterogeneous population
cases. We also illustrate our main theoretical guarantees with simulations.
4.3.1 Homogeneous Population
In this section, we consider a homogeneous population of agents with the policy
pi1, i.e., the case µ(1) = 1. In other words, we assume that every agent i acts
according to pi1.
First, we focus on the next-step outcome and establish closed-form expres-
sions for the expectation of the number of agents taking action A.
Lemma 1 (Conditional Distribution of nAt ). Suppose that n
A
t−1 takes a fixed
value n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and that all agents are of policy pi1. Consider an arbitrary
time step t > 1 and arbitrary nAt−1. Let pσ,n , Φσ(cB(N − n)− cA(n)). Then,
we have
P(nAt = m | nAt−1 = n) =
(
N
m
)
pmσ,n(1− pσ,n)N−m.
Proof. Recall that yA,i1 := cA(n
A
t ) + wi, and y
B,i
1 := cB(N − nAt ) + wi. Notice
that ait is a random variable. The number of agents taking action A at time t
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is:
nAt =
N∑
i=1
1[ait=A].
Clearly, for a fixed t, {wAi,t−wBi,t : i = 1, . . . , N} is i.i.d. with normal distribution
N(0, σ2). Hence, for a fixed t, {1[ait=A] : i = 1, . . . , N} are i.i.d. Bernoulli random
variables, each with parameter P(ait = A).
Let Φσ denote the tail probability function of the distribution N(0, σ
2).
Observe that
P(ait = A) = P(y
A,i
t < y
B,i
t )
= P(cA(nAt−1) + wAi,t < cB(N − nAt−1) + wBi,t)
= P(wAi,t − wBi,t < cB(N − nAt−1)− cA(nAt−1))
= Φσ(cB(N − n)− cA(n)) = pσ,n,
where we used the assumption that nAt−1 = n.
Since nAt is a sum of Bernoulli random variables, the claim follows by the
binomial probability mass function.
Next, we can derive a closed-form expression for the expectation of the next-
step social cost.
Theorem 1 (Expected Next-step Social Cost). Let us take the assumptions
as in Lemma 1. For every parameter σ > 0, and allocation n ∈ {1, . . . , N} to
action A, we have
EC(nAt )
C(n)
=
∞∑
m=−∞
C(m)
C(n)
(
N
m
)
pmσ,n(1− pσ,n)N−m,
where the expectation is conditioned on nAt−1 = n.
Proof. Observe that
EC(nAt ) =
∞∑
m=−∞
C(m)P(nAt = m)
=
∞∑
m=−∞
C(m)
(
N
m
)
pmσ,n∗(1− pσ,n∗)N−m. (8)
The claim follows.
Recall that n∗ denotes the socially optimal allocation of agents to action A.
Figure 3a2 illustrates the expected social cost of Theorem 1 as a function of the
2In Figure 3a and throughout the paper, all error-bar plots are averaged over 100 simula-
tions with error bars corresponding to one standard deviation.
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Figure 3: σ-scalar signalling, homogeneous population of N = 40, and the cost
functions of Figure 1a.
parameter σ, along with the simulated mean and standard deviation of C(nAt ).
In particular, observe that by setting σ = 0.3, the next-step social cost C(nAt )
achieves the theoretical minimum social cost C(n∗) of Figure 3a, provided that
the population distribution is optimal at the current time step (nAt−1 = n
∗).
Furthermore, Figure 3b shows the time-averaged social cost ĈT can achieve
values close to the theoretical minimum social cost by setting the parameter σ
appropriately. Hence, σ-scalar signalling is useful even when we do not satisfy
the condition nAt−1 = n
∗ for many time indices t.
Remark 2 (Optimal σ). It is clear from Figure 3a and by substituting pσ,n ,
Φσ(cB(N − n)− cA(n)) into Theorem 1 that we can readily minimise the next-
step expected social cost by optimising the amount of noise σ.
Next, we quantify the concentration of the social cost around its expected
value, which is already hinted at in the error bars of Figure 3a.
Theorem 2 (Concentration of Next-step Social Cost). Suppose that the as-
sumptions of Theorem 1 and that the functions cA and cB are Lipschitz with
constant L. We have
P
(∣∣∣∣C(nAt )C(n∗) − EC(nAt )C(n∗)
∣∣∣∣ > ε) 6 2 exp(−2ε2C(n∗)2(L+ 1)
)
,
where the probability is conditioned on nAt−1 = n
∗.
Proof. Let
Xi = 1[ait=A], for all i = 1, . . . , N,
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so that nAt =
∑
iXi. Let f be such that
f(X1, . . . , XN )
= C(nAt )/C(n
∗)
=
1
C(n∗)
[∑
iXi
N
· cA
(∑
iXi
N
)
+
N −∑iXi
N
· cB
(
N −∑iXi
N
)]
.
Let x1, . . . , xN , x̂i ∈ {0, 1}. Observe that since cA and cB take values in [0, 1]
and are L-Lipschitz by assumption, by simple algebra, we obtain
sup |f(x1, . . . , xN )− f(x1, . . . , x̂i, . . . , xN )|
6 2(1/N + L/N)
C(n∗)
,
for all i. Hence, by McDiarmid’s inequality, we obtain the claim.
Next, we consider the normalised random process nAt /N for t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
In particular, we consider the expectation of that process, i.e., the sequence
xit , P(ait = A) = E
nAt
N
, t = 1, 2, . . .
We show that this sequence converges. In order words, the action profile of
every agent converges under σ-scalar signalling if every agent follows the pi1
policy (7).
Theorem 3 (Convergence). Suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 1 hold.
For every initial condition xi1 = P(ai1 = A), the sequence xit = P(ait = A)
converges as t→∞.
Proof. Observe that, for all t > 2, we have
xit = P(ait = A) (9)
= P(wAi,t − wBi,t < cB(N − nAt−1)− cA(nAt−1)) (10)
=
∑
m
P(wAi,t − wBi,t < cB(N −m)− cA(m))P(nAt−1 = m) (11)
=
∑
m
Φσ(cB(N −m)− cA(m))P(nAt−1 = m), (12)
where
P(nAt−1 = m) =
(
N
m
)
P(ait−1)m(1− P(ait−1))N−m (13)
=
(
N
m
)
(xit−1)
m(1− xit−1)N−m. (14)
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Figure 4: σ-scalar signalling, homogeneous population of N = 40, and the cost
functions of Figure 1a.
By combining (12) and (13), we obtain a function f : R→ R that describes
the iterated function process {xit : t = 1, 2, . . .}:
xit = f(x
i
t−1), for all t.
It is easy to verify that there exists an ` < 1 such that for all x, y,
|f(x)− f(y)| 6 ` |x− y| .
Hence, f is a contraction and the claim follows from Banach fixed-point theorem.
To illustrate Theorem 3, Figure 4a shows the process xit for various values
of σ, whereas Figure 4b shows the related random process {nAt /N}. Observe
that for the parameter value σ = 0.6, the process {nAt /N} converges to values
close to the optimal population profile n∗/N = 0.2 (cf. Figure 1b), whereas for
other parameter values, we see flapping in the population profiles and values
away from the optimum.
As a corollary of Theorem 3, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1. The random processes nAt /N and C(n
A
t ) converge in distribution
as t→∞.
Remark 3 (Limit of C(nAt )). It follows from Theorem 3 that the limit distribu-
tion of the random process C(nAt ) depends on the parameter σ, which can be
optimised.
4.3.2 Heterogeneous Population
In this section, we consider a distribution µ = (µ1, . . . , µK) of agents over the
policies pi1, . . . , piK , i.e., with µjN agents with delays j for j = 1, . . . ,K. We
first derive the following analogue of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 (Conditional Distribution of nAt ). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds.
Consider an arbitrary time step t > K and suppose that nAt−k = n0 for all
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Figure 5: σ-scalar signalling on the cost functions of Figure 1a with N = 40
agents.
k = 1, . . . ,K. Let pσ , Φσ(cB(N − n0)− cA(n0)). Then, we have
P(nAt = m | nAt−k = n0 for k = 1, . . . ,K)
=
∑
|α|=m
(
m
α
) K∏
j=1
(
µjN
αj
)
pαjσ (1− pσ)µjN−αj ,
where α = (α1, . . . , αK) denotes a multi-index.
Proof. Let nAj,t denote the number of agent of type j who choose action A at
time t. By the same argument as Lemma 1, we have
P(nAj,t = m) =
(
µjN
m
)
pmσ (1− pσ)µjN−m, j = 1, . . . ,K.
By definition, we have
P(nAt = m) = P
 K∑
j=1
nAj,t = m

=
∑
|α|=m
(
m
α
)
P(nA1,t = α1) . . .P(nAK,t = αK).
The claim follows by algebra.
Using Lemma 2, we can readily derive analogues of the expected next-step
social cost (Theorem 1), the concentration of social cost (Theorem 2), and
the convergence of action profiles (Theorem 3) guarantees for heterogeneous
populations. Figures 5a illustrates the convergence of the population profile
nAt /N with a heterogeneous population under σ-scalar signalling. Observe that,
as in Figure 4b, a cyclic flapping behaviour is visible at low values of δ, e.g.,
δ = 0.1.
An empirical study of the time-averaged social cost Ĉt shows a dependence
on the parameter σ similar to the next-step social cost C(nAt ), which can be
seen by comparing Figure 5b to Figure 3a.
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Central Agent
Randomization νt, ηt
Agent 1
Agent N
st = (ut, ut, vt, vt)
st
+
a1t
aNt
...
DelayCost functions
Estimation of Population
nAt , n
B
t
µ over [0, 1]
nAt−1, n
B
t−1cA(n
A
t−1), cB(n
B
t−1)
Figure 6: Block diagram for interval signalling.
5 Interval Signalling
In this section, we model agents with various levels of risk aversion, and present a
broadcast signalling scheme that desynchronises them. Each signal is composed
of pairs of endpoints, hence, the name interval signalling. The overall closed-
loop system composed of the central agent and the agents is shown in Figure 6.
5.1 (δ, γ)-Interval signalling
In this section, we present a signalling scheme that broadcast the same signal
to all agents. Let δ and γ denote non-negative constants. In the (δ, γ)-interval
signalling scheme, a central agent broadcasts to all agents the same signal sit = st
for all i. This is in constrast to σ-scalar signalling, where the central agent
sends a distinct signal to every agent i. For every time step t, the signal st =
(uAt , u
A
t , u
B
t , u
B
t ) ∈ R4 is defined as follows3:
uAt , cA(nAt−1) + νt − δ/2, uAt , cA(nAt−1) + νt + δ/2, (15)
uBt , cB(nBt−1) + ηt − γ/2, uBt , cB(nBt−1) + ηt + γ/2. (16)
where νt and ηt are i.i.d. uniform random variables with supports:
Supp(νt) = [−δ/2, δ/2], Supp(ηt) = [−γ/2, γ/2].
Figure 7 illustrates the interval [uAt , u
A
t ].
3This corresponds to the case d = 4 in (4).
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RuAt cA(n
A
t−1) uAt
-ff−νt + δ/2
-ff δ
Figure 7: An illustration of interval signalling.
By construction, it is clear that (δ, γ)-interval signalling scheme has the
following property, which we call interval-truthfulness:
cA(n
A
t−1) ∈ [uA,it , uA,it ] and cB(nBt−1) ∈ [uB,it , uB,it ]
with probability 1 for all i and t. We will show in Section 5.2 that it is also
possible to pick the parameters (δ, γ) to reduce the social cost.
5.1.1 piλ-policies
In the case of interval signalling, we consider a set of agent types Ω = [0, 1],
where the type captures a level of risk aversion. Recall that every agent receives
the same interval signal st := (ut, ut, vt, vt). In response, we assume that each
agent of type λ follows the policy piλ:
ait = pi
λ(Sit) = pi
λ(st) := arg min
X∈{A,B}
λuXt + (1− λ)uXt . (17)
These policies naturally model a notion of risk aversion. Observe that for λ = 0,
policy pi0 models a risk-averse agent, who makes decisions based solely on upper
endpoints uAt and u
B
t of the respective intervals. Similarly, pi
1 and pi1/2 model
risk-seeking and risk-neutral agents. Although the extremes may be rare, it
seems plausible that people combine the optimistic and pessimistic views in this
fashion. The following example illustrates these policies.
Example 1. Suppose that at time t = 1, we have cA(n
A
1 ) = 1 and cB(n
B
1 ) = 1.
For δ = 1, γ = 0.5, the interval signal s2 := (u2, u2, v2, v2) at time 2, could take
the realisation of (0.5, 1.5, 0.8, 1.3). The risk-seeking agent with λ = 1 would
pick A, whereas the risk-averse agent with λ = 0 would pick B.
5.2 Guarantees
In this section, we consider (δ, γ)-interval signalling and piλ-policies. For sig-
nalling scheme that broadcasts the same signal to all agents, the outcome corre-
sponding to homogeneous populations is trivial since all agents would pick the
same action. Hence, we consider directly a heterogenous population over a set
of types [0, 1] and a population distribution µ.
First, we derive a lemma for the conditional probability of taking action A.
The main result of this section is an expression to evaluate the expected next-
step social cost for a µ-heterogeneous population under (δ, γ)-interval signalling.
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Lemma 3 (Conditional Probability of Action A). Let Fδ,γ,n(λ) , P(piλ(st) =
A | nAt−1 = n) denote, for every λ ∈ Ω, the probability of an agent with policy piλ
choosing action A conditioned on the realisation of the random variable nAt−1.
We have
Fδ,γ,n(λ) = P(νt + ηt > cA(n) + δ(1/2− λ)
− cB(N − n)− γ(1/2− λ)),
where νt and ηt are independent uniform random variables with supports [−δ/2, δ/2]
and [−γ/2, γ/2].
Proof. For every λ ∈ Ω, the probability of an agent with policy piλ choosing
action A is
P(piλ(st) = A)
= P(λuAt + (1− λ)uAt < λuBt + (1− λ)uBt )
= P(cA(nAt−1) + δ(1/2− λ)− cB(N − nAt−1)− γ(1/2− λ)
< −νt + ηt),
where the first equality follows by definition of the policy piλ, and the second
equality follows by the definition of (δ, γ)-interval signalling and simple algebra.
The claim follows from the fact that −νt has the same distribution as νt by
definition.
Theorem 4 (Expected Next-Step Social Cost). Suppose that the assumptions
of Lemma 3 hold with n = n∗. Let pδ,γ,n∗ ,
∫
λ∈[0,1] Fδ,γ,n∗(λ)µ(dλ). We have
EC(nAt )
C(n∗)
=
∞∑
m=−∞
C(m)
C(n∗)
(
N
m
)
pmδ,γ,n∗(1− pδ,γ,n∗)N−m.
Proof. By the definition Fδ,γ,n∗(λ) , P(piλ(st) = A | nAt−1 = n∗), we have
P(nAt = m | nAt−1 = n∗) =
(
N
m
)
pmδ,γ,n∗(1− pδ,γ,n∗)N−m.
The claim follows by the same argument as the proof of Theorem 1 – cf. (8).
Figure 8 presents in heat-map form the dependence of the next-step so-
cial cost C(nAt+1) on the parameters δ and γ of the interval signalling scheme.
Clearly, the optimal (δ, γ)-values are a non-trivial region bounded away from
0 and ∞. The simulated next-step social cost C(nAt+1) on Figure 8a coincides
with the expected value of C(nAt+1) computed using Theorem 4 on Figure 8b.
Remark 4 (Concentration of C(nAt )/C(n
∗)). In the case of (δ, γ)-interval sig-
nalling, the social cost ratio C(nAt )/C(n
∗) is concentrated around the mean in
a similar fashion to Theorem 2.
16
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
γ
1.20
1.25
1.30
1.35
1.40
1.45
1.50
1.55
1.60
C(nAt+1):
δ
(a) Simulated next-step social cost C(nAt+1)
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Figure 8: (δ, γ)-interval signalling, cost functions of Figure 1a, and heteroge-
neous population with N = 40 and µ uniform over {1/N, . . . , 1}.
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Figure 9: (δ, γ)-interval signalling on the cost functions of Figure 1a
5.3 Long-Run Behaviour
In this section, we study empirically the long-run behaviour of the state process
nAt /N under (δ, γ)-interval signalling. Figure 9a shows the simulated the time
evolution of nAt /N . As in Figure 4b, a severe flapping effect is exhibited at a low
value of δ, e.g., δ = 0.5. For higher values of δ, there are hints of convergence.
Figure 9b shows the dependence of the time-averaged social cost ĈT on one
parameter δ, with the other parameter fixed at γ = 0.2. Observe that the
dependence is similar to that exhibited in the case of σ-scalar signalling (cf. 3a);
moreover, at the optimal value of the parameter δ, the social cost – although
random – is close to the theoretical minimum (cf. 1b).
6 Conclusion
Our analysis and simulations give quantitative guidance on how to design sig-
nalling schemes in order to reduce the social cost. In particular, if we can
estimate the true population mixture, e.g., using statistical estimation tech-
niques, then we can optimise the signalling scheme to minimise the social cost.
Although our analysis focuses on a congestion problem with two resources, the
results can be extended to an arbitrary number of resources, e.g., by replacing
the binomial distributions by a multinomial distribution in the analysis.
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In contrast to signals that report past outcomes as deterministic numbers,
which correspond to singular probability distributions, we propose random sig-
nals with non-singular distributions. When agents mistake deterministic signals
for precise predictions of the future, their actions lead to the cyclic flapping
behaviour. We show that agents who receive random signals with non-singular
distributions exhibit cyclic behaviour to a lesser degree, which can improve the
social cost.
Regarding future work, we pose several new questions that can be studied
by extending our model. What happens when population size and composition
change over time? This can be modeled by a Markovian sequence of random
variables corresponding to agent types. How do the optimal parameter values
for σ, δ, γ depend on those changes? This can be done by employing state-space
control techniques to obtain these optimal values. Would our results hold if
every agent had a distinct cost function, so as to model the priority given to
some agents, e.g., when evacuating the young and elderly? This requires a new
notion of consistency or truthfulness that is specialised to individual agents, as
well as a new analysis.
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